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he financial crisis signalled the need for a real paradigm shift in prudential regulation, 
but this apparently has not yet happened. It is now evident that boards and senior 
management of banks had great difficulty in appreciating the magnitude of the risks 
being taken in their market departments, and actually understood the implications of those risks 
even less. This is likely to become even more the case after the current proposals for bank’s 
capital adequacy regulation are implemented. In their response to the crisis, policy-makers and 
regulators seem intent on further complicating the already complex maze of financial market 
rules by amending existing rules on the fringes. 
The Basel capital adequacy rules, which were implemented in the EU with the capital 
requirements Directive, serve as the centrepiece of prudential regulation of the banking sector. 
Initially proposed in 1988, the rules were substantially amended in 2005, generalising the use of 
credit ratings for risk weightings in the external ratings-based approach, and the use of internal 
models for more advanced financial institutions. Basel sets a minimum capital requirement of 
8% for the banking book, but the differentiation of risk weightings prevented supervisors from 
noticing the growing degree of leverage in the financial system. For example, the Belgian bank 
Dexia, an early casualty of the crisis, had a Basel tier 1 ratio of 11.4% in June 2008, but a core 
capital ratio of only 1.6%! In the context of the current crisis, a key weakness in the risk-
weighting system of the Basel framework is the strong bias towards real estate. Capital charges 
for mortgage lending stand at half that applied to commercial loans, and can go to 35% for 
residential mortgages. In response to the crisis, these core rules are not being fundamentally 
reconsidered, but rendered even more complex in a host of amendments.  
What amendments are on the table or under consideration? 
-  5% for securitisation or ‘skin in the game’. A first proposal to amend the Basel directive 
has been under discussion since June 2008. It requires banks in credit risk transfer products 
to hold at least 5% (initially 10%) of the securitisation issuance, to provide the right 
incentives in ‘originate and distribution’ activities. This amendment is counterproductive as 
it undermines securitisation and forces banks to increase their balance sheets, whereas they 
should be reduced. Provisions of the 2004 MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive) already require banks to take “all reasonable steps” to “prevent conflicts of 
interest from adversely affecting the interests of its clients”, and these could apply to 
securitisation activities. Additional elements of the amendments, which were adopted by the 
EU in April 2009, include tighter rules for large exposures and rules on special ‘hybrid’ 
capital items. 
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-  Additional rules on executive compensation. A consultation was launched at the end of 
April 2009, following the agreement reached at the G-20 Summit, introducing the 
obligation for credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain 
remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management. 
Generally speaking, remuneration should not encourage excessive risk-taking and be in line 
with the long-term objectives of the firm. Payment of bonuses should be deferred. Excessive 
remuneration packages can lead to extra capital charges. In our view, such rules are difficult 
to set at European level, because of the large differences in labour and tax law. Moreover, 
they can easily be circumvented they are impossible to enforce. 
-  Increased capital requirements for the trading book and higher capital charges for 
certain securitisation positions, as proposed by the European Commission on 13 July 2009. 
Capital charges for trading positions would at least double, and securitisation positions 
would have same risk weight as in the banking book. Re-securitisation exposures, such as 
CDO’s, should be completely deducted from capital, rather than be risk-weighted.  
-  Dynamic provisioning. Not yet formally proposed but under discussion for quite some 
time is a requirement for banks to build up extra capital buffers in good years, which could 
be used in bad years. The size of the buffer would be calculated as a percentage of the total 
outstanding loans and of doubtful loans, as is currently practised in Spain. The July 2009 
Council of Finance Ministers meeting urged the European Commission to come forward 
with proposals on the subject. The problem, however, is that no EU-wide harmonised 
definition of doubtful loans exists at present. 
-  Special liquidity requirements. Also not yet formally proposed, but under consideration 
by regulators are harmonised liquidity requirements for EU-based banks. Liquidity 
regulation is not regulated at EU level, but is left to the member states, which use qualitative 
or quantitative requirements, or a mixture of both. These requirements were also imposed 
without distinguishing between branches and subsidiaries of host-country financial 
institutions. The danger is that EU harmonisation may set a quantitative requirement, 
without sufficiently talking into account the differences in risk profiles of banks. 
What would a true paradigm shift consist of? The pillars of Basel II could be kept: capital 
requirements, supervisory review and market disclosure. But the risk-weighting system and the 
use of internal models should be scrapped in favour of a simple transparent capital requirement.
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Dynamic provisioning can be a useful addition. Moreover, the balance between the different 
pillars needs to be strengthened. Liquidity requirements should be addressed under the second 
pillar of the supervisory review, i.e. left to the discretion of supervisors as depending upon the 
risk profile of the bank, but applied on a European-wide basis. Market disclosure is not taken 
seriously enough in Europe, as the debate surrounding stress tests demonstrates. In addition, 
external risk audits should be carried out by external firms and be submitted to supervisors, and 
disclosed in an annex to the annual report. As banks’ risk management practices left much to be 
desired, an external assessment by specialised firms of these internal controls and procedures 
would be a useful addition to the control by supervisory authorities. 
Other elements of the paradigm shift would be the introduction of a narrow banking system, or 
the application of a ‘safety net’ with depositor protection to a limited part of the banking 
system. Everything else falling outside would be subject to pure free market forces. In addition, 
to avoid ‘too-big-too-fail’ and domino effects, strict anti-trust and competition policy rules 
would be imposed on the financial system. 
More interesting proposals for the fundamental reform of the capital adequacy system in 
banking could be conceived, but to our knowledge, they have not surfaced. Given the depth of 
the financial crisis and the huge policy failures, more new thinking should be devoted to the 
future of prudential regulation. 
                                                      
1 Carmine di Noia and Stefano Micossi, Keep it simple: Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis, CEPS, 
2009. 